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A social contract lens has considerable value as a framework for understanding rights and 
responsibilities within risk governance research. The social contract lens is crucial for questioning 
state responsibility, and examining citizen demands in the aftermath of climate and natural hazard-
based disasters (O’Brien et al 2009, Pelling and Dill 2006, 2010, Pelling 2011, Siddiqi 2012, 
Yenugopal and Yasir 2017, Blackburn 2018). Arguably, this lens is analytically useful even when 
“vague about the precise definition of the social contract adopted.” Much of this literature employing 
social contract frameworks in disaster research tends to refer to an abstraction that determines the 
general distribution of rights and responsibilities, and citizen expectations, of the state in the aftermath 
of climate and natural hazard-based disasters (Blackburn and Pelling forthcoming). The role played 
by the state and determined by such a state-citizen social contract, in the aftermath of disasters has 
been usefully interrogated in recent years (Cohen and Walker 2008, Olson and Gawronski, 2010, 
Taras 2015, Wood and Wright 2016). There are however few studies that engage with citizenship; and 
how people’s experience of citizenship is affected or transformed by disasters (Chhotray 2014, Remes 
2016 & Siddiqi 2017).  
 
Political science research has often questioned state legitimacy and instability in the aftermath of a 
disaster (Healy and Malhotra 2009, Gasper and Reeves 2011, Cole et al 2012 & Chang and Berdiev 
2015). Natural hazard-based disasters negatively impact the state-citizen relationship. The very basis 
of a social contract is challenged when the state is seen as unable to provide basic security to its 
citizens. This perceived failure in, any variation of, a state-citizen contract, results in wavering of 
citizen consent to be governed and a re-thinking of political relationships in disaster affected 
communities. In fact, it has been suggested that “temporary breaks in the dominant political and social 
systems post-disaster open space for alternative social and political organizations to emerge” (Pelling 
and Dill 2010, 25). In regions of the world suffering from conflict and insurgency, it is further 
believed that the wavering of citizen consent in the aftermath of a disaster enables rebel and insurgent 
groups to use the state ‘failure’ (Le Billion and Waizenegger 2007) to their advantage (Walch 2014), 
capturing political space and establishing their own citizenship-based contract with local populations.  
 
Broken social contracts are believed to manifest in a direct relationship developing between ‘state 
failure’ and ‘insurgent capture’ of the post-disaster political space. However, Siddiqi’s (2014) work 
illustrates the problems associated with this ‘linear’ understanding of post-disaster politics and 
encourages a more nuanced understanding of such complex political moments. In this paper we take 
on that challenge and offer new insights that enhance our understanding of how natural hazard-based 
disasters affect citizenship in areas facing protracted insecurity and conflict. The paper focuses on the 
regions of Mindanao in Southern Philippines, where people have been living amidst communist and 
separatist insurgencies while experiencing slow and sudden onset hazard-based disasters. It argues 
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that, to an extent, disasters reveal the resilience rather than weaknesses prevalent within dominant 
social contracts.  
 
In particular, it illustrates how anxieties and inequities prevalent within the terms of this contract, are 
lived through the experience of citizenship by those subjected to its governing regime. Far from being 
simply ‘broken’ and thereby enabling ‘insurgent capture’ of post disaster political space, we argue 
that the unequal and exclusionary geographies of state intervention expose the malleable resilience of 
the postcolonial social contract. The case study of Mindanao provides evidence of a post-disaster 
moment revealing a differentiated and multi-tiered citizenship defined by the state-citizen contract in 
the region. The unequal manifestations of citizenship were partly negotiated, and partly contingent 
upon the terms under which the postcolonial social contract was forged in Mindanao. Post disaster 
development interventions in areas suffering sustained insecurity have significant consequences for 
how citizenship is experienced under different social contracts. Disaster studies can no longer ignore 
this situation. 
 
This paper is divided into four parts. The first discusses the analytical and conceptual framing. The 
second discusses the case of South Eastern Mindanao affected by the 2012 Typhoon Pablo. Mindanao 
is populated by indigenous peoples facing a communist insurgency from the New People’s Army 
(NPA) fighting the state since the 1960s. The third presents a case study of an area beset by the 
intricate problems of hazard and violence-induced vulnerability in a densely populated urban zone of 
Zamboanga City. The region has been simultaneously ravaged by disastrous monsoon waves and 
long-standing violent nationalist secessionist war led by Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) for 
the last half a century. The concluding section offers some analysis on the findings. 
 
The state-citizen relationship: disasters and insecurity in the post-colony  
 
The nature of social contracts determines post-disaster state intervention 
 
This paper takes as a starting point scholarship that challenges ideas of the social contract as a 
singular form of consent emerging at a particular juncture of social history (Sisk 1995, Rubin 1996, 
2012). It recognises that consent is not only dynamic and changing but also forged by citizens and the 
state through a series of particular events and reconfigurations either tacitly or explicitly (Waldron 
1989: 22). From this perspective, social contracts are not static forms of comfortable acquiescence but 
have historical, often painful, antecedents. These include indigenous forms of consensual 
arrangements between people and their leaders. These arrangements can often be violently 
reconfigured by modern state formations or political forces that challenged them.  
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Blackburn and Pelling (forthcoming) argue that while classical social contract thinking may have 
been reserved for determining people’s relationship with a sovereign, it is important to recognise that 
this contract is indeed flexible, and should describe the “distribution of rights and responsibilities 
between parties”, tribal groups or religious communities. Equally, the authors also emphasise that 
while social contract theory has historically been more concerned with the terms of this agreement, to 
make this lens work for disaster studies there is a more urgent need to engage with the critical 
political and social juncture at which it is negotiated and re-negotiated. The aftermath of disasters 
provides an opportunity for state and citizens to renegotiate and reconfigure social contracts, creating 
new spaces of citizenship experience and engagement. That said, we argue in this paper that social 
contracts are negotiated settlements between citizens’ demands and state responsibility that are on the 
one hand, dynamic and changing. While on the other hand, they are also remarkably resilient in 
reproducing and reinforcing the foundational inequities on which they were built. 
 
According to Acemoglu’s (2003) view of social conflict theory, those who hold political power 
knowingly pursue inefficient policy outcomes to maximize their own payoffs. Disasters do not create 
such conflict. They are unequivocally problematic for ruling political regimes. Writing about political 
failure in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Ignatieff (2005) states that, “when the levees broke, the 
contract of American citizenship failed.”   When a state does not provide a minimum level of security 
to its citizens affected by disaster, it fails to fulfil its most basic responsibility. This often pushes the 
affected citizens to demand their rights or political change. Disasters have therefore been framed as 
governance deficits that ‘break’ social contracts and catalyse ‘windows of opportunity’ or ‘tipping 
points’ for social change (Pelling and Dill, 2006, 2010, Birkmann et al, 2010). By fracturing the state-
citizen contract, natural hazard related disasters cause both parties to fundamentally re-think their 
relationship with each other. Evidently, a state’s response after a disaster is profoundly determined by 
the nature of the social contract with its citizens.  
 
de Waal’s (1996) work revealed that when a state is truly fearful of social and public action, in the 
case of large-scale disasters, it works towards new anti-disaster guarantees renegotiating the very 
terms of the social contract. Alternatively, states have also used disasters to reassert their own power, 
prevent political mobilisation and keep political challengers out (Cohen and Werker 2008). 
Earthquakes in both China (1976) and Turkey (1999) resulted in authoritarian regimes advancing their 
own visions of development while quashing burgeoning oppositional discourse (Pelling, 2011). State 
response to natural hazard based disasters is often dependent on the degree of ‘trust’ people place in 
ruling regimes and their ‘belief’ in institutional response determined by the nature and type of state-
citizen contracts (Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2010; Akbar and Aldrich 2017).     
 
The trust deficit between state and citizens  
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‘Trust’ and ‘belief’ in state institutions, are critically important features of a social contract. The 
deficit in trust and belief is now recognised not only for determining rights and responsibilities after a 
disaster but also as a key driver of anti-state action in ‘backward’ and ‘rural’ communities in the 
postcolonial context. For decades literature has referred to people’s motivation to fight against the 
state in terms of either: ‘greed’ (of those seeking to access the material or resource wealth within a 
wider polity) or ‘grievance’ (of groups left behind in state-led development) (Collier and Hoeffler 
1998, 2002 & 2004, Fearson and Laitin 2001 & Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2008). However, recent 
anthropological work has convincingly argued the case for looking beyond these motivations and 
towards a sustained failing in social contracts and the conditions they deliver. There is research 
suggesting that motivation to join insurgencies is driven by the need to express moral outrage at an 
unjust state and to receive “emotional in-process benefits” (Wood 2001, 143). Shah (2013) points out 
that the motivation is to feel “the significance of relations of intimacy” when dealing with a distant 
and far off state. By way of analysis, Shah (2013) explains that unjust social contracts result in 
unequal and exclusionary experiences of citizenship giving rise to insurgency movements.  
 
Where the state uses the anxieties and inequities prevalent in postcolonial social contracts to construct 
a state-citizen relationship based on domination and exploitation of its ‘rural’ and ‘marginal’ citizens, 
insurgents often make a very different, even more egalitarian, experience of citizenship possible 
(Shah 2007, 2010 & 2013). Scott’s (1976) seminal work in particular, emphasises that the 
postcolonial state has not only been historically complicit in burdening ‘peasants’ through taxation 
and revenue demands but also provided the “legal and coercive machinery” through which such a 
state-citizen relationship can be forged. Thus, explaining not only why insurgencies find recruits in 
these marginal and rural areas but also identifying some of the inherent crises and injustices within 
state-citizen social contracts, manifesting as unequal experiences of citizenship, even before disaster 
unfolds. 
 
In most analysis of ‘state failure’ and ‘broken social contracts’, governments are both unable and 
unwilling to reach out to those suffering from disasters, in areas beset with insurgency. In fact “rebel 
movements mimic governance strategies associated with the state” to forge their own social contracts 
with citizens (Schouten 2016), and often even on far more equal terms (Shah 2013) than with the 
state. These tensions and inequities in the postcolonial social contract that result in an unequal 
experience of citizenship are often negatively affected by disasters. This is because the experience of 
a disaster can embolden and legitimise the social and political “discourse of anger” against the state 
(Pantti and Wahl-Jorgensen 2011, Pantti et al 2012). The experience of living through a natural 
hazard based disaster, constructing and re-living narratives of the event, and the actions of people 
trying to rebuild their lives can result in a particular rights’ claim to citizenship. This social process 
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should not be viewed as one that ‘breaks’ social contracts in ways that result in ‘state failure’ and 
‘insurgent capture’ but rather importantly recognise the extent to which it is being determined by the 
underlying negotiation, or a re-negotiation, of the state-citizen contract. 
 
Experiencing citizenship in the aftermath of disasters 
 
Social contracts may turn a progressive corner after large-scale disasters (Siddiqi 2013) that generate 
“disaster citizenship” and expand citizen rights (Siddiqi 2017). Such “disaster citizenship” is used to 
make increased citizen demands from the state in the aftermath of natural hazard-based disasters. 
Other times citizens may also, refuse to alter the terms of the state’s engagement with this contract. 
Citizens remain unwilling to cede any further ‘citizen acquiescence or consent’ (Blackburn and 
Pelling forthcoming) in exchange for greater protection from the state (Remes 2016). The impact of a 
disaster on citizenship experience is determined by the state-citizen social contract and the extent to 
which it is resilient or flexible to change. Our evidence indicates that even in conflict and insurgency 
affected areas, citizenship does not simply collapse in the aftermath of disasters, due to ‘broken’ 
social contracts but takes contextually driven turns. The empirical work shows that social contracts 
are far more malleable and resilient, unlikely to ‘break’ in ways that result in ‘state failure’ and 
insurgent ‘capture’, even in the aftermath of climate and natural hazard-based disasters in insurgency 
affected areas.      
 
Our case studies explore the lived complexities of citizenship in the aftermath of two separate and 
distinct disasters that unfolded in the region of Mindanao, in Southern Philippines. These islands have 
been a site of armed communist and separatist insurgencies since the 1960s, while also suffering from 
natural hazard related disasters, including the 2012 Category 5 typhoon in the south-east and more 
frequent but destructive seasonal tidal flows along the waterfront in Western Mindanao. Our research 
in these areas do not show evidence of a ‘broken social contract’ that would allow insurgent and rebel 
groups to ‘occupy’ governable spaces left vacant by the state in the aftermath of disasters. However, 
our findings demonstrate the resiliency of the state-citizen social contract in Mindanao. We argue that 
the social contract has reproduced unequal experience of citizenship that marginalises the (poorer) 
indigenous and Muslim communities and is, at least partly, contingent upon the nature of the social 
contract forged in postcolonial Philippines as demonstrated in the next section. 
Our evidence illustrates that state interventions to re-settle citizens in the aftermath of disasters 
resulted in a profoundly unequal experience of citizenship, distrust in state sanctioned ideas (and 
providers) of ‘security’ and a range of shifting material realities on the ground. The Filipino state 
demonstrated that the social contract was not damaged or destroyed but differentiated across class, 
indigenous groups and religions creating an unequal experience of citizenship. Significantly, these 
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inequalities are rooted in the history of the formation of social contracts in Mindanao and not factored 
by state disaster management approaches. Post disaster development interventions, particularly in 
areas suffering from sustained insecurity, have significant consequences for postcolonial experiences 
of citizenship under different social contracts that state disaster policy does not always recognise. This 
work contributes “towards a postcolonial disaster studies” (Carrigan 2016). It also follows in the 
footsteps of Bankoff (2004, 2007) and discusses the history, culture and politics of Mindanao. 
Mindanao is a region where any social contract is forged by the strength of social relations inasmuch 
as by agreement with a sovereign. 
 
The Contingencies of Postcolonial Social Contract  
 
The social contracts binding the Philippine state and its constituencies are far from a priori but, rather, 
an outcome of complex events including the country’s colonial history, intricate politics of 
postcolonial state formation as well as the agency of its subjective constituencies. Insurgency and 
secessionist movements in Mindanao primarily operate in areas that are home to diverse indigenous 
and Muslim ethnic societies organised around distinctive social contract philosophies. While diverse, 
these social contracts were founded on kindred relations, connections to ancestral lands, cosmology, 
and religious orientations.
1
  Underpinning these relations and connections are traditions of solidarity, 
leadership, laws, customs, and jurisprudence configured by the strength of society, characteristic of 
past Southeast Asian galactic polities, as opposed to highly centralised state authority that reflects its 
contemporary socio-political configurations (Tambiah, 1979; cf. Migdal, 1988; Fox and Sather 1996; 
Gibson and Sillander, 2011).
2
  
 
The driving forces behind these broadly diffused indigenous and Muslim societies were persons of 
prowess, embodied by the sultans and a coterie of community chiefs. They established authority not 
through coercive power but in accordance to skill and adroitness at addressing legal, social, economic, 
security, land, residential, and ecological concerns of their respective constituencies (Abinales 2000, 
McKenna 1998 Majul 1973, Tan 1994, Warren 1983, Warren 2002). However, the authority of the 
sultanates and the chiefs gradually declined due to internal strife and sustained assaults by the Spanish 
conquerors between 1600 and 1900. Finally buckling under a brutal United States military campaign 
in the Twentieth Century (Kramer 2006, Abinales 2005). Soon after consolidating its foothold in the 
                                                
1
 An indigenous people’s alliance called the Lumad Mindanao asserts that at least 48 groups of peoples with 
distinct culture, identity, history, traditions, and even language make up the indigenous constituencies in 
Mindanao. The secessionist group, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), has in many occasions presented an 
idea that their constituency comprises of 13 Islamised “tribes” collectively referred as the “Bangsamoro 
people”. 
2
 Extensive ethnographic accounts on indigenous peoples in Mindanao are widely covered in past (Saleeby 
1905) and recent works (Gaspar 2011, Gatmaytan 2005, Manuel 2000, McKenna 1999, Schlegel 1970).  
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 7
Philippines, American colonial agents introduced a series of sweeping land laws that opened up native 
lands to corporate and individual ownership. These laws engendered the resettlement of tens of 
thousands of landless populations from the central and northern regions of the Philippines that had 
posed significant political challenges to the colonial government. While colonialism succeeded in 
suppressing the old but dispersed sovereign powers of Mindanao, it did not necessarily undermine the 
older forms of social contracts binding their constituencies. The sultans and chiefs continued to hold 
on to their roles as men of prowess, adroit in finding solutions to pressing community concerns.   
 
The ascendancy of postcolonial authority, however, posed greater challenge to the old social order 
and the contracts that underpinned them, as it sought to establish a universal social contract centred on 
the nation state as part of decolonisation.  In many ways, the end of colonialism in 1945 and the onset 
of decolonisation
3
 effectively shifted the authority of the social contract from the persons of prowess 
to state agencies with mandates to consolidate its emergent citizenry.   Central to the pursuit of these 
mandates was an overarching land policy of expropriating Mindanao resources to corporations that 
invested in the fledging postcolonial national economy and the redistribution of its idyllic fields to 
insurgents waging an agrarian-based rebellion in Northern Philippines.  The new policies created a 
national legal land structure that essentially shut off the indigenous and Muslim societies of Mindanao 
from land redistribution process but privileged other citizens from elsewhere in the nascent nation 
state. Consequently, these policies precipitated a massive influx of citizens from up north that 
eventually outnumbered Mindanao’s native population and set into motion their “minoritisation” 
(Jubair 2000, Tan 1994, Rodil 1993).4  
 
The contingencies and politics of postcolonial state established an unequal national social contract 
built on tiered citizenship. The landowning majority assumed the status of privileged citizens while 
landless became “minority citizens” (with far less defined legal rights and entitlements) practically 
reduced to “neither citizen nor alien” (cf. Chatterji 2012: 1051). Nonetheless, these unequal policies 
succeeded in integrating indigenous and Muslim communities into the broader national constituency 
incorporated into the state-centred social contract. Moreover, the policies underpinning this national 
social contract were not necessarily set in stone but occasionally revisited and reformed to further 
entrench the existing inequalities between ‘landowning’ and ‘landless’ citizens. This is evident in the 
state’s response in the aftermath of a disaster. However, the state does not necessarily initiate these 
reforms unilaterally but in the course of active citizenship engagements by a minority population 
demanding, negotiating, and advocating for better rights, entitlements, legal protection, 
                                                
3
 Decolonisation refers to the processes, events, and transformation of mind set marking the transition from 
colonial to postcolonial rule (Berger 2004, Betts 2005). 
4
 Indigenous and Muslim groups in the Philippines were officially regarded as national minorities under policies 
adopted by the 1954 Commission of National Integration and the Presidential Assistance to National Minorities.  
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 8
accountability, and better governance under the terms of the postcolonial social contract as shown by 
the cases below. 
 
Case one: Experiencing a category 5 typhoon and differentiated citizenship 
 
Between February and September 2017, the first author spent three months doing ethnographic 
fieldwork in one ‘community’ (two Puroks, in different Sitios, in the same Barangay) in the 
Compostela Valley Province of South-Eastern Mindanao. The field site is located in the New Bataan 
municipality, referred by the press as ‘ground zero’ (National Post 7 Dec 2012, Inquirer 6 Dec 2015) 
of Typhoon Pablo
5
, a category 5 super typhoon that made landfall on the East Coast of Mindanao on 3 
December 2012 (NBC News, 9 Nov 2013). Since Mindanao lies outside of the Philippines typhoon 
belt, it was considered ‘typhoon free’ within national discourse (Inquirer, 26 Jan 2014). The 
inadequate resources and lack of disaster preparedness was evident in local (community and 
government) narratives of confusion and panic that led to large-scale destruction and mass casualties. 
 
Geographical characteristics of New Bataan municipality include a high altitude, surrounding 
mountain ranges and significant forest cover with a considerable indigenous population and numerous 
commercial mining and logging operations. Political scientists argue that such “resource rich” area 
with a “rough terrain” inhabited by marginalised indigenous communities makes it particularly 
amenable to insurgent activity (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Fearson & Laitin 2001, Hegre 2003)
6
. 
Unsurprisingly, it is a known stronghold of the communist guerrillas, the New People’s Army (NPA). 
Living amidst a conflict between the insurgents and the state was a consistent challenge highlighted 
by all residents interviewed in the area. 
  
The data from one hundred interviews and three digital story telling workshops, depicts how local 
residents have learnt to live with, even ‘naturalise’ (Stanko 2000), the NPA insurgency. The 
insurgents live in the forested uplands (CIA 1987), and tend to pass through villages in search of food, 
or other supplies.  Residents often prefer not to name the NPA but use safe words, such as, ‘the other 
side’, ‘men with no shoes7’, ‘people from the bukid’8 and refer to their supporters as masa9. In this 
way, the conflict was simultaneously hidden from plain sight but also an extremely pervasive part of 
life (Hall, 2007) in this region of New Bataan. As a non-native researcher, the author followed in the 
                                                
5
 Internationally known as Typhoon Bhopa 
6
 For a critique see Daly 2012 
7 The NPA insurgency is a peasant led movement with a large proportion of tribal and indigenous population 
whose members cannot afford to buy shoes. Some reports indicate that the group can steal shoes from those 
killed or captured during armed conflict.  
8
 Tagalog word for ‘farm’. People from the bukid are generally peasants. 
9 Transliteration of the Maoist reference to ‘mass-based’ or people 
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footsteps of those who have conducted research in insurgency affected areas while maintaining ethical 
standards (Nordstorm and Robben 1996, Smythe & Robinson 2001, Wood 2001 & 2006).   
 
State intervention and differentiated experience of citizenship in the aftermath of Typhoon Pablo 
 
In this barangay, it was evident that a state-citizen contract was not destroyed due to Typhoon Pablo 
but was acutely differentiated across groups, creating a multi-tiered experience of citizenship amongst 
disaster affected populations. This experience was determined by “a set of themes expressed in a 
series of contestations, negotiations and compromises” after the disaster (Remes 2015, 196). The 
ownership of homes not only manifested inequalities prevalent in the social contract but also affected 
the experience of citizenship. In Holston’s (2008, 113) words “for most citizens, the effect was 
overwhelming: their status as illegal residents subverted their civil citizenship”.  
 
The Compostela Valley Province of Mindanao was affected by disasters and conflict. The fieldwork 
in this area reveals that the Filipino state intervened in the aftermath of Typhoon Pablo, despite the 
insurgency and trust deficit between state and people. This intervention was enabled by effective and 
decentralised municipal government agencies: the Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction Management 
(MDRRM) and Municipal Social Welfare Department (MSWD). The two agencies have local 
legitimacy because of their effective policy interventions in a tense region (Jackson, 2017). When 
addressing citizens’ vulnerabilities to disasters, the state reached out to all affected residential 
property holders in the region. This created a profoundly unequal and differentiated experience of 
citizenship.  
 
After Typhoon Pablo, Residents of Purok B were evacuated to a nearby plateau. Subsequently, a 
Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) assessment classified Purok B as uninhabitable, prone to 
serious landslides and flooding. Therefore, the municipal government issued formal warnings to 
residents relocated to ‘the plateau’ not to return to their homes in Purok B. This forcible resettlement 
on the plateau began as an unpopular move within the community but was made more palatable in 
2013, when the government allocated plots of land to all legally registered households of the original 
Purok to build permanent houses. They were also provided building materials and PHP25,000
10
 to pay 
for labour and building costs. This resulted in a shiny new housing community of colourful yellow 
and green houses springing up on the plateau.  
 
In the years since the typhoon, local agencies propagated a discourse that miscreants returning to live 
in the original purok would not be the responsibility of the state, particularly during a disaster. As 
                                                
10 Approximately £330 
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such, all residents of the plateau believe that returning to their old homes in Purok B means that they 
would be forfeiting certain rights of citizenship, particularly around state rescue and relief during a 
disaster.   
 
When I asked a middle aged woman about instructions she received from the government, she said: 
 
Yes, they told us that we cannot live in our old home. That place has been marked as 
“X”. They don't allow us to live here... I remember that they warned us… that if there 
will be another disaster they will not rescue us. We will not be their responsibility. 
 
Another young labourer in his early thirties echoed that the government had declared no 
responsibilities towards citizens choosing to live in Purok B: 
 
… it is critical over there. The government will not allow us to stay there… People 
from DSWD11 and from other agencies, warned us that whatever happens in the 
original Purok, even if there are still people living there it is not their responsibility. 
(After a disaster) if they need to be rescued or need relief they have to be here in 
plateau. 
 
Several conversations revealed that residents relocated to the plateau, lived in fear of forfeiting their 
right to state rescue and relief, in the event of another natural disaster, if they returned to Purok B. 
This also manifested the grossly unequal experience of citizenship. Those citizens not relocated to the 
plateau remained in the hazard prone area, Purok B, where they remain vulnerable to hazard-based 
disasters with very limited legal and political entitlements to relief (Sen 1981).  
 
Fieldwork in the summer of 2017 revealed that half of the houses in Purok B were still occupied after 
Typhoon Pablo as some people carried on living there. A number of residents from the plateau 
regularly visit Purok B for farming and livelihood necessities (as the municipality will not allow 
people to keep livestock or grow crops on the plateau). Though Purok B was declared ‘uninhabitable’ 
and extremely hazardous, it is now also home to new residents.  
 
An informant, Joy, was an effervescent twenty-two-year-old mother expecting her second child. Joy 
lived with her young family in a house abandoned by her parents in Purok B. Joy was not entitled to a 
state funded house on the plateau because she was not legally an adult and started a family a few 
years after Typhoon Pablo. She looked longingly towards the plateau and said her husband was saving 
                                                
11 Department of Social Welfare and Development 
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money to buy a house there. Joy’s neighbour, was a middle aged indigenous Mandaya12 woman of 
meagre means from a remote upland barangay. She had moved into the typhoon battered house 
abandoned by wealthier relatives who relocated to a bright coloured new house on the plateau. 
Another informant living in Purok B was a woman in her late sixties who moved into a house 
abandoned by her son’s family because she had bad knees making it difficult to climb to their house 
on the plateau. There were several residents in similar circumstances. 
 
Evidence from the fieldwork shows that informants still living in original Purok B (an area considered 
dangerous, hazard prone and not ‘state responsibility’) were physically, financially or socially 
vulnerable residents who had either been unsuccessful at demonstrating legal entitlement to a house 
on the plateau or who moved into an abandoned house because they had nowhere else to live. In fact, 
Purok B’s marginal status combined with resident’s obvious vulnerabilities created skewed social 
power relations.   
 
One of the first houses upon entering Purok B, was inhabited by a male labourer in his early twenties. 
This house was abandoned by his parents, but he made it his home whenever he returned from the city 
so he could drink alcohol and smoke during the day with friends. Engaging in such anti-social 
behaviour was clearly forbidden in the new housing community governed by a local committee and a 
strict set of rules for community responsibility and behaviour on the plateau. However, the original 
Purok B where economically and physically vulnerable residents primarily reside does not have 
residential rules and perhaps, more evidently, no one powerful enough to enforce them. 
 
As part of post-disaster intervention after Typhoon Pablo, the state had a universal mandate to address 
the vulnerability of citizens and provide them with a permanent and safe home not prone to natural 
hazards. As one local Councillor of the barangay explained: 
 
The MGB identified our area (in Purok B) as unsafe because we are surrounded by 
the river. The local government unit (LGU) decided to find an area that is safe for us 
and the MGB assessment identified the plateau. The LGU therefore bought the 1 
hectare plot of land and the MSWD (Municipal Social Welfare and Development) 
through PSWD (Provincial Social Welfare and Development) funded the building of 
new houses. So that’s what happened, they convinced our brothers in ‘Purok B’13 to 
transfer to plateau… for their own safety. 
                                                
12
 Mindanao has about 18 different recognised indigenous and tribal groups collectively called Lumad (native). 
The Mandaya are one of these groups and were the majority in the field site where research was done in 
Compostela Valley. 
13 The name of the village has been replaced with a pseudonym  
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An official from the MDRRM Office also stated that the evacuation and resettlement of residents 
from this purok was driven by government concerns for safety and security of its citizens: 
 
Their area was flattened when it suffered flash floods during Pablo. That is why they 
(government agencies) declared the area a “no build zone” and all residents were 
relocated by the government.  
 
This demonstrates that the post-disaster resettlement policy had a clear goal of relocating all residents 
from the area vulnerable to flooding and landslides. However, the state relocation programme 
benefited those who could demonstrate residential rights and were willing to make the harder journey 
to the plateau. Thus, the intervention created a category of preferred citizen deeply reminiscent of the 
postcolonial social contract. Therefore the new and unofficial ‘minority citizens’ became those 
without residential ownership and those with limited or no access to land rights. On one hand, the 
post-disaster policy resulted in a progressive and positive experience of citizenship for residents 
allocated safer, newer and better homes. On the other hand, the policy pushed the most vulnerable 
towards abandoned houses in a dangerous and hazard prone area. This not only increased their 
exposure to risk but also denied them the same rescue and relief citizenship rights associated with 
residential legality.  
 
The inequalities that underlie the social contract between the state and its citizens in Mindanao 
facilitated the creation of different categories of citizenship in the aftermath of the disaster. Citizens 
with ownership rights were privileged, ‘visible’ and had a more formal relationship with the state. As 
such, they received further safety and security after Typhoon Pablo. Nevertheless, for citizens without 
recognisable residential properties and a tenuous relationship with the state, their experience of 
citizenship was exactly the opposite. Their more tenuous relationship with the state, characterised by 
residential precarity, resulted in condemning them to the margins of illegality. A state-citizen contract 
was therefore evident and tangible in the aftermath of the disaster. This relationship was differentiated 
by residential rights, with the state reaching out to people through the ‘legality’ of ownership, 
resulting in multi-tiered ‘disaster citizenship’. Citizens already facing different forms of economic, 
physical and social vulnerabilities were not only marginalised but also further exposed to the vagaries 
of violent conflict between state and the NPA as demonstrated below. 
 
State provided security and differentiated citizenship in the aftermath of Typhoon Pablo 
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Much has been written about indigenous and local communities living with, and participating in, 
armed insurgency against the postcolonial state (Wood 2001, Mkandawire 2002, Joshi and Mason 
2007). This literature has also been criticised for giving no agency to people themselves (Shah 2013, 
Krovel 2011), representing them only as hapless victims stuck between different sides of the conflict 
(Stoll 1993). Yet evidence from this barangay reveals that residents entitled to state intervention made 
the active decision accept relocation to the plateau that is difficult climb and far from their farms.  
This decision is partly explained by the fact that beyond greater vulnerability to natural hazards, 
residents of the original Purok B were also exposed to insurgency and conflict. While residents of the 
plateau had legal ownership of their homes and received state services, those in Purok B lived in an 
area considered uninhabitable or ‘no build zone’ by the state. Thus, living on the very margins of 
legality and illegality. Consequently, as the paper will now illustrate, Typhoon Pablo exposed citizens 
in Purok B to insecurity and conflict. The post-typhoon Pablo experience of citizenship was 
differentiated by vulnerability to natural hazard as well as encounters with armed conflict between 
military and NPA insurgents.   
Speaking about insurgency in the region, the former chairman of this purok now residing on the 
plateau, said: 
… the conflict of the soldiers and the NPA, left us affected. When many of the NPA 
were killed by the military, we were accused of supporting them. When we were 
living in ‘original Purok B’, this was one of our problems… We told the government 
that we would be forced to obey them at times because we are just civilians. We 
didn’t choose sides. 
 
He makes it clear that while living in Purok B, citizens were caught between two sides of the conflict. 
The topography of the plateau – a considerably hard to climb small elevation covered with ninety new 
houses very close together - makes it difficult for the military to conduct regular surveillance against 
NPA insurgents. However, Purok B is nearer to a particularly mountainous barangay well known for 
being an NPA stronghold and is referred to as a “rebel corridor”.14 There is also a permanent military 
encampment operating a checkpoint since 2015. According to rules of engagement, military camps 
have to be at a considerable distance from residential homes.15 However, since Typhoon Pablo 
residents living in Purok B are not legally entitled to be there and are living in between illegality and 
informality. As such, it was possible for the military camp to be stationed there. While residents in 
Purok B were not afraid of the NPA insurgents but were worried about the possibility of being caught 
between an “encounter” between the military and the NPA. 
                                                
14
 Taken from official statement released on social media 
15 Interview with civil society activist. 
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As one middle-aged woman said: 
 
To tell you the truth, if there's no military it is much better. We will not feel scared 
because (for us) there is no enemy. 
 
And another young man in his early thirties explained: 
 
It’s dangerous here because in time of war you are here and it is not safe. You cannot 
say you are safe if their presence (military) is here. You are not the one that they are 
guarding, it is the hydro company.16 So, if there’s an encounter then you will get 
stuck in between and maybe even get killed because they will never know and think 
maybe you are one of them (insurgents). So that is why it is not safe. 
 
In fact, some residents of plateau were obviously grateful for their more preferential citizenship status. 
A former Chairman of the purok added that: 
 
As long as the military camp is away from us it is fine, their guidelines even say that 
they should be a certain distance away from people’s homes. But as you have seen 
that is not happening in ‘original Purok B’, that is why it is dangerous there. 
 
While Ignatieff (2005) and Walch (2014) argue that the social contract ‘breaks’ in the aftermath of 
disasters in conflict situations, this barangay in Mindanao tells the story of a very tangible and 
evident relationship between the state and its citizens. The state intervened with a clear policy in the 
aftermath of Typhoon Pablo in conflict-affected parts of New Bataan. The inequalities evident in the 
social contract resulted in a differentiated and multi-tiered ‘disaster citizenship’ experiences. A social 
contract built on the inclusion of certain groups and the exclusion of the ‘minority citizens’, was once 
again a guiding framework in deepening anxieties and tensions within postcolonial citizenship in 
Mindanao. 
 
Case Two: Disaster Citizenship and Inequality in Post-conflict Zamboanga 
 
The inequities within the postcolonial social contract, manifesting through the experience of disaster 
citizenship in Compostela Valley, are reflected in the succession of hazard and conflict-induced 
disaster events in Zamboanga City, west of Mindanao. During the monsoon season in 2012, vigorous 
                                                
16
 Several informants expressed that the military camp was stationed there to provide security to a hydro-power 
project under construction rather than ‘them’. 
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tides and large waves battered the densely populated coast of Zamboanga. The monsoon waves 
destroyed houses on stilts, home to marginalized Muslim Tausug, Yakan, and Sama-speaking 
communities and indigenous groups of Sama Dilaut. In 2013, a month long firefight between 
government forces and a faction of the separatist MNLF destroyed the houses and neighbouring 
structures owned by entrepreneurs, middle income residents, and other urban poor (BBC News, 
2013). The violence displaced at least 118,000 persons and flattened about 10,000 structures from a 
sprawling maze of streets and blocks of hovels, middleclass housing, and trading depots (NDRRMC, 
2013).  
 
Coincidentally, the conflict zone once served as a sanctuary for families fleeing from secessionist 
violence that, as described earlier, was an outgrowth of the political tensions resulting from unequal 
land, property, and power relations emerging from the complexity of the Philippines’ decolonisation 
experience.  From 1970s, the continuing influx of war-weary settlers transformed the green wetland 
into a heavily-populated residential and commercial enclave with property owners and supposedly 
illegal residents. Eventually, the zone became a critical component of Zamboanga’s political 
landscape, source of cheap labour and urban poor voters for politicians sustaining the ambiguous 
property status as a “political technique” that the “elites master for constituting legitimate power” (cf. 
Holston 2011: 313). “Far from holding apart the legal and the illegal, just and unjust, public and 
private,” the ambiguity of the land status of coastal Zamboanga was carefully managed, a feat made 
possible by deeply-entrenched inequality underpinning the state-citizen contract in the Philippines 
(Holston, 313).  
  
The continuum of hazard and conflict induced disasters in Zambaonga presents another lens for 
viewing the resilience and tensions generated by the unequal terms of postcolonial social contracts in 
the aftermath of extreme disaster events. The second author engaged in long-term ethnographic study 
in Zamboanga. This included a year-long fieldwork from October 2009 to October 2010, visits during 
armed conflict in September 2013 and a series of short travels during the reconstruction work from 
October 2013 to 2016. The following narrative reflects conversations with about thirty informants 
while ‘hanging-out’ (Geertz 1998) with the displaced in evacuation camps, temporary and more 
permanent housing relocation as well as when they engaged with state officials and aid groups. 
 
Property Rights as Basis for Hazard Protection Priorities 
 
The state swiftly responded to the 2012 and 2013 events. This indicated a social contract was evident 
rather than weak, or fractured, during extreme disaster in Zamboanga. The state promptly extended 
food aid and other basic necessities to residents on the very first day of displacement. While swift, the 
quality of intervention underlying these responses is not necessarily even handed but was significantly 
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determined by the property status of the disaster affected citizens. Following the damaging 2012 
monsoon waves, the government distributed food packs and medical assistance to landless residents 
whose homes were swept away. The aftermath of the far more destructive events of 2013 marked a 
critical difference in the form and quality of state response to propertied and non-propertied citizens. 
Landowning entrepreneurs received lucrative packages of state assistance, such as business loans, 
exemption from paying standard wages to their workers, and unfettered access to return to their 
respective properties. By contrast non-landowners crushed by the fighting received the usual food aid, 
small cash, temporary or permanent housing in areas chosen by the state.  Furthermore, after 
relocation, non-propertied citizens were barred from returning to the sites of their devastated homes. 
 
Similar to the Compostela Valley experience, government agents in Zamboanga invoked pre-disaster 
property relations anchored on land titles for managing citizen’s access to their old homes. This 
“strategy of governing” in the aftermath of a disaster hinged not on the citizen’s degree of exposure to 
security issues, risk and hazards but, rather, to private property rights (cf. Sterett 2016: 579). This 
strategy is driven by the proprietorial concept of formal landownership established by Spanish and 
American colonial rulers and reproduced by postcolonial administrators as the core component of the 
social contract. The legal philosophy of property ownership serves as the primary indicator for 
determining who gets priority for protection rather than citizen’s vulnerability to disaster risk and 
hazards.  
 
The ideology of property rights underpins government blueprint for intervention and is evident in the 
Zamboanga Roadmap to Recovery and Reconstruction.
17
 The recovery plan, an essential aspect of the 
government commitment to the social contract distinguished not only the conflict-affected private 
landowners from the landless but also sub-divided the landless into four classes of citizens: 
homeowners whose dwelling structures were devastated, renters, and the sharers who lived with 
homeowners without necessarily paying rent. The fourth category refers to the so-called “fake 
evacuees,” displaced people (who do not qualify in any of the first three categories) seen as 
constituencies aiming nothing but gaming the system to win over welfare benefits from the state 
(MindaNews, 2014). Moreover, the Zamboanga plan declared the waterfront - an ancestral home of 
indigenous Sama people - a “no build zone.”
18
 The declaration mandated relocating people through a 
“pre-emptive resettlement” approach to managing risk and hazards in post-disaster reconstruction 
                                                
17
 The Zamboanga recovery blueprint allocated about 5,000 housing units for some 7,000 families required to 
pass stringent assessment for citizens entitled to receive post-conflict government housing and benefits. The 
targeted beneficiaries were less than the over 9,000 families identified as pre-conflict residents by an 
interagency post-disaster needs assessment earlier. 
18
 The Zamboanga plan requires the planting of mangroves in former areas of the waterfront community on the 
premise that such move conforms to national environmental policies such as the Clean Water Act. The 
regulations established a “no build zone” within twenty metres from the waterline of any body of water to 
reduce the risk of a hazard-induced disaster. 
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work (Correa 2011, Claudionos 2014, Ferris 2015: 114, Carrasco et.al. 2016a, Carrasco et.al. 2016b, 
Vlaminck et.al. 2016, Tadgell 2017).  
 
Capacity and Limits of Disaster Citizenship in Zamboanga 
 
The Zamboanga case study further shows that the making of a postcolonial social contract in a post-
disaster setting is not exclusively determined by the state.  Landless citizens did not simply accept the 
government recovery plan but contested, negotiated, and cleverly tapped on legal resources 
introduced during the decolonisation process. These acts not only reflect the idea of “disaster 
citizenship,” but also reveal the capacity and limitation of the displaced citizens when progressively 
influencing the substantive features of a social contract. In addition, this shows the openness of the 
state that allows citizens to expand their rights, demand entitlements, and force the state to deliver 
their end of the commitment to the social contract (Siddiqi 2013, 2017).  Immediately after the 
government announced plans to redevelop the devastated zones and relocate non-propertied residents, 
some of the displaced closed ranks and mounted a sustained “no to relocation” campaign, an initiative 
that can be describe as a form of “political action” following the tradition of “militant citizenship” 
from a disaster-stricken population (cf. Pantti and Wahl-Jorgensen 2011: 107, cf. Southard 2011).  
 
The general message of the Zamboanga protest suggests that pre-emptive resettlement is a 
maladaptive risk reduction strategy that compromises their cultural affinity, historic attachment to 
their communities, and access to income sources while infringing their “freedoms of settlement and 
livelihood” (Tadgell 2017: 452, also see Adger et.al. 2003; Dhakal and Mahmod 2014; Ncube-Phiri, 
et.al. 2014; Johnson 2012).  Some of the displaced scoured old government property records and in 
the process recovered obscure presidential orders delineating their settlement as Muslim cultural 
village in the 1950s, the first decade of Philippine decolonisation experience. The discovery of a 
document (part of uneven postcolonial state reforms addressing the plight of its minority citizens) 
provided the displaced with a crucial legal documentation supporting their claims for rebuilding their 
homes in the devastated zone by virtue of cultural affinity and historical attachments. In other words, 
landless disaster-affected citizens utilised a legal instrument for decolonisation to demand changes in 
the recovery plan and partially reset the terms of the postcolonial social contract through active 
citizenship in the aftermath of a disaster. 
 
Eventually, state officials backed down from their initial plan of removing all residents from 
devastated zones. Instead, the state ushered international humanitarian agencies to participate in the 
crafting of a recovery plan similar to the “build back better” approach to post 2006 Indian Ocean 
tsunami disaster recovery (c.f. Lyons, Shiderman, and Saunders 2010).  A third of the landless 
displaced population were allowed to return and live in new housing built up in some parts of the 
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devastated zone. However, more than half the number of the displaced families, were relocated 
elsewhere in the city with those considered “fake evacuees” denied any housing assistance. 
 
The Zamboanga case shows that social contracts do not easily ‘break’ in ways that result in ‘state 
failure’ or ‘insurgent capture’ in the aftermath of a disaster event. Rather they are, in some instances 
invoked, rather passionately, by state officials and the citizens as they collide and also confer to 
institute change in the adaptive instruments for post-disaster recovery. 
These acts illustrate the contingent character of the postcolonial social contract that while unequal is 
also a flexible setting by which the state and citizens critically engage each other. As Siddiqi noted, 
the aftermath of disasters is a complex political moment, which cannot be viewed simply from the 
binary frames of ‘state’ or ‘insurgent’ capture but a site by which “disaster citizenship” can be further 
examined (Siddiqi 2014, 2017).   
 
Driving Disaster Citizenship through Contestations, Negotiations, and Tensions  
 
Ethnographic evidence from Southern Pakistan also illustrates how the state-citizen contract was 
strengthen in instead of ‘broken’ in the aftermath of 2011 and 2012 disastrous flooding events. Siddiqi 
reported that the state and citizens managed to reach more progressive terms of moral solidarities, 
showing how an aftermath of disaster generated ‘transformative’ change and held the social contract 
together though in complex terms (Siddiqi 2017: 3).   
 
The citizenship experience in Zamboanga shows that these progressive transformations were also 
driven by contestations, negotiations, and tensions in a postcolonial state that values property 
protection far more than security of disaster-stricken citizens without properties. Once the state had 
instrumentalised the disaster experience to enforce postcolonial land laws favouring the propertied 
class, the landless disaster-affected citizens took political action, negotiated and forced the state to 
revise the finer details of a post-conflict reconstruction plan.  However, while the displaced of 
Zamboanga succeeded in forcing some changes in the government recovery blueprint, the final plan 
allowed only a few of the landless residents to return to the devastated zones. Those limitations spell 
out the deep-seated inequities shaping the mechanisms for reconstruction, risk reduction, and broader 
adaptation strategies in recovering from a disaster event (Mitra et al 2017, Obrien et al 2009, Pelling 
and Dill 2010).   
 
The depth by which the ideology of private landownership is embedded in the government response 
to the succession of hazard and conflict-induced disasters in Zamboanga reflects the inequities in the 
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social contract in Philippines. Hazard, risk reduction, and recovery policies are mobilised not 
necessarily as instruments of protection but tools for extending or withholding certain entitlements to 
particular classes of citizens. Disaster events show that vulnerability is as much configured by the 
complex dynamics of human agency, the ecosystem, and extreme physical hazards and postcolonial 
social contract underpinned by unequal political, economic, and property relations rooted in the 
legacy of colonialism and decolonisation (c.f. Bankoff 2003: 106). 
 
Conclusion: Postcolonial social contracts and the disaster-conflict space 
 
The two cases presented in this paper demonstrate that social contracts did not ‘break’ in ways that 
resulted in ‘state failure’ and ‘insurgent capture’ but were malleable and resilient in the aftermath of 
disasters in insurgency affected areas. Examining two different regions (East versus West Mindanao), 
cultures (indigenous versus Muslim) and insurgencies (communist versus separatist) further 
emphasises the robustness of these research findings. The state interventions, and citizenship 
experience of residents, in post-disaster Compostela Valley and Zamboanga were not random 
occurrences but a systematic response defined partially by the terms of the state-citizen contract. 
Despite active insurgencies in these areas, there was limited evidence of citizenship collapsing in the 
aftermath of the disaster. Equally, insurgents could not use that collapse to forge their own social 
contracts. Crucially, this work demonstrates that citizenship rights and their experiences were 
differentiated across landowning and landless citizens, reproducing the very inequities and anxieties 
prevalent within the postcolonial social contract of Mindanao. While the disaster enabled new 
modalities of state-citizen engagement and interaction, the inequalities within the social contract 
eventually prevailed. 
 
 It is evident that post disaster development interventions, in areas suffering from sustained insecurity 
and conflict, risk reproducing and intensifying the injustices prevalent in social contracts, if they fail 
to recognize the resilience and manifestation of this state-citizen contract in the postcolonial world. 
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